I. THE INSIGHT: ONE MAY HAVE TO SPECULATE AS TO SOME FACTS RELEVANT TO WHETHER CONDUCT IS JUSTIFIED
Professor Ferzan's paper highlights an important insight regarding self-defense: that the operation of the defense is inevitably speculative. The actor cannot know with certainty what in fact will happen if she does or does not act; she can only act with regard to the facts as she knows them. But this aspect of Professor Ferzan's insight only restates the obvious reason for having a mistake-as-to-a-justification excuse (MAJ): in order to insure that an actor's blameworthiness is ultimately judged by the culpability, if any, inherent in the decision she makes. The MAJ doctrine is similar in operation to the oper ation of culpability requirements in offense definitions: the objective elements may define the prohibited conduct, but lia bility does not follow upon that showing alone but only upon a showing of culpability as to those objective elements.
But Professor Ferzan's insight goes further, and has special implications for self-defense: even for the adjudicator, self-defense is necessarily a speculative business. That is, even in a �vorld of perfect evidence gathering and event reconstruction, the decision maker cannot know the facts needed to determine with certainty the essential elements of self-defense, such as whether the force used was really necessary to prevent an attack. For example, * I would like to thank the organizers of the conference, chief among them Professor Ferzan, for their efforts in convening such an interesting and useful forum. when the hostage acts upon an opportunity on Tuesday to kill the kidnapper who has threatened death at the end of the week, we can never know whether the kidnapper would have changed his mind, making the killing unnecessary.
This distinguishes the self-defense situation from the offense definition situation: an effective fact-finding tribunal typically can determine with some certainty whether the objective offense elements are satisfied, that is, whether an injury was caused, whether a partner was underage, whether the property belonged to another, etc. But the same tribunal can only speculate about whether the objective elements of self-defense existed.
It may be true that this typically is not a problem of practical significance. Complete and absolute certainly may not be pos sible but the actual level of uncertainty typically is trivial. An angry attacker is swinging her arm to stab you in the chest. It is conceivable that, for reasons unknown, she might change her mind in the next moment, but such an event would be quite rare in the course of human events. We tend not to take seriously the purely theoretical existence of uncertainty. But there are a few scenarios where the uncertainty cannot be ignored, as is the case with the abductor who threatens to kill at the end of the week. While it may not be likely, it is in fact conceivable that something -a change of mind, intervention by police, etc. -may intervene to avoid the need for the killing by the hostage.
II. DOES THE INSIGHT MEAN THAT JUSTIFICATIONS MUST NECESSARILY BE SUBJECTIVE?
From her insight, Professor Ferzan draws the conclusion that self-defense is necessarily, unavoidably subjective and, there fore, that we must jettison the objective 'deeds' theory of jus tification in favor of the subjective 'reasons' theory.
I admire the insight but disagree with the conclusion. Professor Ferzan's insight leads to her conclusion along this simple path:
if the actor cannot know the actual future, her blamewor thiness can only be judged by the culpability of her belief, that is, judged by the reasonableness of her prediction of the future that she cannot know. To judge her otherwise for example, according to purely objective criteria -is unjust both because she cannot know the facts and, worse, even the adjudicator cannot know the facts. The only available criteria by which her blameworthiness can fairly and feasibly be judged is subjective.
I agree with this entire line of reasoning. My point is only that it has nothing to do with the objective 'deeds' theory of justification and its advantages over a subjective "reasons" theory (that is, the advantages of segregating the issue of objective justification from the issue of MAJ).
Professor Ferzan appears to begin with an assumption that the purpose of the justification defense is to assess the actor's has problems and that the subjective formulation must be used.
The move is analogous, I suggest, to that in Kent Greenawalt's well-known piece in which he misconceives justification defenses to include the MAJ excuse then, not surprisingly, finds the borders of justification and excuse to be "perplexing. My specific point here is that justification defenses need have no more to do with an ultimate blameworthiness assessment than do the objective requirements of offense definitions-indeed the two are similar in that both set the rules of conduct for future action. We do not conclude that the objective requirements are somehow immoral because they ignore blameworthiness; we know they will be modified by a host of other doctrines in the blameworthiness machine, including the offense culpability requirements. We can have the same assurance with regard to an objective justification defense: it serves its purpose of setting the rules for (future) conduct, but is only one cog in the blamewor thiness machine; the results of the justification defenses will be cranked though other provisions, including the MAJ rules. must ask how justification's rules of conduct should take account of the inevitably-speculative nature of some facts rel evant to justification? That is a fair question, which I will ad dress, but before doing so let me note a preliminary point.
The issue that the inevitably-speculative point raises here is not one that involves the objective vs subjective justification dis pute. The risk to be defined here is not the ex post adjudication of risk-taking by which blameworthiness is judged. It is not a "subjective" issue at all, taking "subjective" to refer to some particular actor's actual awareness of risk in her mind at some given moment. Rather, the issue is one of the ex ante objective definition of prohibited risks. That is, it involves defining in objective terms for all actors a rule to guide future actors in self defense situations. It has nothing to do with a particular actor's subjective awareness of risk and everything to do with society's balance of competing interests. How much should society value the certain loss of life of the abductor as against the risk of death of the hostage? Where on the continuum of risk is the point beyond which a self-defender cannot go? Thus, there is nothing in the "inevitably-speculative" insight that undercuts an objective theory of justification.
It is true that the objective theory must deal with an uncertainty, specifically our inability to know at the moment of action what the world would be like in the case of inaction.
One could even say that this uncertainty means that there exists at the moment of decision a "risk." But as I have argued elsewhere, 7 there is a difference between a particular actor's subjective risk-taking and the existence of objective ex ante uncertainties. In deciding what to do when facing an uncertainty, a specific actor may engage in subjective risk- University of Pennsylvania Law School 3400 Chestnut Street Philadelphia P A, 19104-6204 USA
